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According to the Gulf War Air Power Survev:
To avoid JFACC control, XVIII Airborne Corps advanced the FSCL [the Fire Support Coordination Line--a line on the campaign maps insrde which, to avoid fnendly fire accidents, the ground commander, not the JFACC, controlled all sorttes] well north of the Euphrates River on 27 February and thus reserved an area for attack helicopter operations unconstrained by any requirement to coordinate with the JFACC. The effect of this use of the FSCL was to hamper air power's ability to destroy escapmg Iraqi ground forces until the FSCL was finally pulled back after several hours 42 6y some estimates, this bureaucratic maneuver (and a similar one by the Army's VII Corps) allowed two dlvrsrons of the Republtcan Guard to escape destructron from the air during the Iraqi retreat 43
In the end, though the air campaign was undoubtedly highly successful, none of the players was partrcularly pleased with the way it was waged Key deasrons tended to evolve from conflict between the partlcrpants Seldom were they made rationally, On the whole, however, the bureaucratic maneuvenng and continual compromising actually had surpnsrngly little effect on the success of the air campaign.
The Gulf War Arr Power Survev explains why-
The superabundance of Coalition aircraft, the absence of serious opposltlon tn the arr or effective attack against coalition arr bases, and the ability of the Coalition to choose the trmrng of the war's beginning all meant that neither the theater commander nor the JFACC ever had to make hard choices in less favorable circumstances They never, for example, had to strip Marines of arr support provided by Manne aircraft, they never had to endanger the fleet by leaving it wrth less than full air defenses in the face of Iraqi air attack, they never had to pull air cover from the soldiers of an ally In the face of enemy attack "
In short, during the Gulf War we fought "big" but not necessanlv "smart". While the air campatgn was undoubtedly far more coherent than previous air operations, thanks to bureaucratic politics rt stall lacked complete unity of effort. Next time we may not have that luxury 
